War symmetric and the role of religion
start with a very important document , Religion and Resistance: Examining the Role of Religion in Irregular Warfare for the originality of the reflection generally, and strangely lacking in the usual military treaties that will face in passing the role of religion in asymmetric warfare. This criticism also applies to the new Bible of the American army, the Counterinsurgency Field Manua l in 2006 by graduates of the officers of Petraeus, from Kilcullen to Nagl. E 'by the Canadian military, a more attentive of hosts and experts from other missions in conventional war, not a document nuovisimmo (March 2009) but in fact it is original and useful because it tended to fill the void of the traditional underestimation of the role of religion as a factor of social cohesion, which builds heavy element, or at least influence, all other areas of life. Anyway, it is strange that gap, because indeed the character of the majority of post-Cold War insurgencies, where the religious character has replaced the ideological justification policy that also had a strong spiritual component, though distorted.
modern war and Al Qaida
Philip Bobbit is a political philosopher and student of military matters which we have already spoken to his two famous books, The Shield of Achilles s (The Shield of Achilles) and Consent and Trerror
both on the transformation of war and the meaning of terrorism in the twenty-first century.
Now the weekly Newsweek wrote a compelling piece 9 in the fight against terrorism in the post September 11 . In the debate that has opened in the U.S. after the recent terrorist attempts and have seen polarize the positions for and against Obama, too soft on terrorists, or even a follower of the Bush-Cheney line, Bobbit draws a pretty good argument. The Bush administration was right to consider the old status quo legislative inadequate before the new challenges posed by Al Qaeda, but the sin of "decisions emergency" (the phrase is mine) because she refused to pass new acts (including which wiretapping, preventive detention) through discussion of the Congress. Bobbit Now for the fight against modern terrorism è essenzialmente una lotta di legittimazione e di diritto. Nella lotta contro nemici non statali – che non è contessa nè per il territorio né per la conquista di risorse naturali - il significato di vittoria va al di là della sconfitta del nemico, ma significa difesa dei civili nel rispetto della legge. Ed è quello che ha fatto Petraeus in Iraq. "Se le leggi sono inadeguate, esse vanno adattate al nuovo contesto strategico".
Sempre sullo stesso periodico, vi è un altro notevole articolo (ma perché i direttori italiani non imparano?) sul significato di "vittoria" nelle guerre moderne, Addio alla vittoria. Una volta le guerre finivano con vincitori e perdenti, now they are complicated . E 'complementary to the previous article and based on the thesis scholar at Columbia Page Fortna argues that if more "war like love is easier to start than to finish," now in the post-Cold War wars modern data in hand, the great majority can not terminate while from 1816 to 1948 the percentage was much higher: over 50%. Why? Because the war has changed, because the most powerful states do not translate their military superiority in the military prevented by a legal and moral framework, national and international level, quite different from that of fifty years ago, because few wars are symmetrical because they are changed or the reasons why you go to war and so on.
USA
The state of the state: a proposal for the reorganization of Foggy Bottom . E 'a study proposed by PPI, Progressive Policy Institute , Foggy Bottom is the name of the State Department, which takes its name from the district where located in Washington. The problem that the Obama Administration is held accountable for nothing is simple: one part due to Sept. 11 there has been a crescendo of tasks and at the same time to a militarization of the assistance, other globalization and information revolution have made obsolete the old pyramid.
Lawrence Korb, assistant defense secretary in the administration Regan points out, rightly, in The generals should be guided by truth, not by politics
a central point in the division of labor between political and military, but you might say, between political and technical. Industry experts should not take political decisions, not for them, but not force reality to please policy. The generals have the responsibility to tell it like it is, even if they are unpleasant and in this regard riporta una serie di esempi. Per venire ai nostri giorni, i comandanti in Afghanistan precedenti a Mc Crystal hanno fatto quello che hanno potuto con i mezzi messi loro a disposizione, con quelle forze sul campo non potevano aver ragione del nemico.
Yemen
Frederik Kagan e Cristopher Harnisch commentano sul Wall Street Journal la situazione in Yemen dove il governo locale deve far fronte a due insorgenze diverse, Al Qaida e le popolazioni scite al nord appoggiate dall'Iran e contrastate dall'Arabia.Ora viste le simpatie, i rapporti tribali, religiosi e ideologici con Al Qaida, il governo di Sana percepisce come nemico principale gli irredentisti sciti e l'espansionismo regionale di Theran, while for the West Stow Lake and of course the greatest danger is the opposite or at least the two enemies are not barter. At the same time it is clear that the U.S. can not intervene with troops and start wars all over the world. Kagan offers a simple solution: if you want to be helped Yemen against Iran, it must then engage in the fight against Al Qaida, starting to cleanse his ill-placed intelligence, How to apply the 'smart power' in Yemen , precisely.
Afghanistan
Brezinski, the grand old man of American politics, with all hyper critical of Bush's policy against the war on terrorism world, has released a lengthy television interview on the Afghan war. Given the importance of the character, deserves to be heard ( first and second part ).
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