Colours In Kitchen With Oak Floor

Questo è il manifesto anti ebraico che circola in rete!

Masterbatating For Women

Antisemitismo puro

Here's a nice "poster that I was reported by Stephen Edward Tabasso Pouches and where you put the index in an idiot, but I hope not dangerous, black list, many friends of Israel. The only consolation against the criminal stupidity (why this is) is a good company.

Leonardo Tirabassi

The list of servants

Sympathetic posters circulating on websites unworthy of mention. Worthy is instead the blacklist drawn up by them.

© - sheets daily

Giulio Meotti

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Can You Take Meloxicam With Excedrin

Serve la Coin?

Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents

by DAVID UCKO  on 22 JULY 2010 ·  11 COMMENTS

As I hear more voices join the chorus against counterinsurgency, both its theory and its practice, I get the sense that the 'counterinsurgency era' that began some time after the invasion of Iraq is now reaching its end. Yes, NATO will retain a presence in Afghanistan for years to come, but there is little enthusiasm for the idea of counterinsurgency or hope that the lessons of FM 3-24 might help, either in Afghanistan or elsewhere. In fact, mentions of FM 3-24 and of counterinsurgency are increasingly likely to invite sniggers, tired sighs or outright hostility ('how dare you theorise about hearts and minds when there's a war going on?').

It might be interesting to trace how an idea so welcome less than four years ago has since fallen from grace. Was it the perceived confidence with which the concept was rolled out? Was it the perceived automacity of its widespread acceptance? Is it anger at the arguably simplistic explanation that counterinsurgency, and counterinsurgency alone, won the day in Iraq? Or is it due to a perception of counterinsurgency experts gaining power and prestige in DC by peddling a theory that is not working so well in Afghanistan?

What follows is an attempt to address some of these issues: how did we get here, are the critics right, and is there anything in this bathwater that should be saved? This is hardly an exhaustive take on the topic, which would require much more than a blog post, but just a few thoughts.

Theory and Practice

This blog has  previously touche d upon  the distinction between counterinsurgency as practiced, particularly in Afghanistan, and as elaborated in theory. It is, to my mind, unfair to conflate these two, yet this tendency lies at the heart of counterinsurgency's decline.

Attempts to disaggregate theory and practice has in turn engendered the accusation that  counterinsurgency is like Marxism , in that its supporters insist on the doctrine's infallibility and claim it simply hasn't been implemented properly. It is a powerful analogy: a concept that survives only on paper has very limited worth.

But counterinsurgency principles have shown practical value, not just in 'counterinsurgency campaigns', but also in other campaigns concerned with stabilisation, pacification, peacebuilding – call it what you want. This is not wholly surprising, as many of these principles are quite banal, even commonsensical:

• Effective strike operations requires good intelligence;
  
• Defeating an armed group requires co-option as well as coercion;
  
• Understanding your environment, its people and structures, will provide for more and better options.
  
• Effective control begins with a monopoly on the use of force;
  
• Legitimacy and trust are important when asking people to follow your lead.
  
• The relationships built with local leaders and populations help determine their level of support for your cause — and so on…
  

A quick survey of past operations and campaigns reveals the  general validity of these broad principles, even if the campaigns they have been associated with were not always successful. Which brings us to Afghanistan…

Operational or Strategic?

A powerful reason why counterinsurgency today is so unpopular is because its principles are looked upon as strategy in their own right. As should be clear, the principles and theory of counterinsurgency are only relevant as a means toward a strategic end, which itself may be more or less realistic: to help a country recover from protracted conflict; to bolster the legitimacy and reach of a government, etc. Even then, the theory is not a silver bullet but mere guidance – a collection of lessons learned – that may help in the design and implementation of an effective  campaign plan , a plan that must, as counterinsurgency theory clearly stipulates, be adapted for specific environments.

Afghanistan muddies the water here, because the link between the stated strategic goal (to 'disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda') and the operational tenets of counterinsurgency is difficult to discern, not just because of the practical difficulties of 'state-building' in Afghanistan, but also because al-Qaeda is not limited to Afghanistan, or even to Pakistan, but would subsist even if the region turns into Central Asia's answer to Switzerland (there are  some parallels ).

More generally, however, counterinsurgency theory would be relevant to attempts at stabilising a war-torn country or to defeat an incipient armed threat to an established government, though importantly, counterinsurgency theory says nothing about the wisdom of embarking on such campaigns (if anything, a note of caution can be parsed from the field manuals and main texts).

Both Antithesis and Thesis

But if counterinsurgency theory is just 'useful guidance' or 'some ideas', what good is it? I think our own Faceless Bureaucrat hit the nail on the head in a  previous post : 'I have suspected for a long time that COIN itself is merely the knee-jerk answer to a previous question, "Do kinetic/conventional/body-count campaigns work?"'. I'm currently reading  Keith L. Shimko 's  The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution,  which provides a bitter reminder of the muddy RMA-type thinking on war within the Pentagon as it invaded Iraq. The discovery of counterinsurgency as a body of theory and lessons was definitely a step forward, but today it is no longer the antithesis, but itself the thesis. Its function as a reaction to muddy thinking is still being served, but it is also being held up in its own right and subjected to critical scrutiny.

That is good: the assumptions, the historical cases leaned upon, and the modern relevance of counterinsurgency theory are all areas that scream out for further research. More generally, much of the scholarship on counterinsurgency can be faulted: as  mentioned previously on this blog , the discussion is often vague and analytically unsatisfying, not least because there is no agreed definition of what 'counterinsurgency' truly is. Furthermore, despite the growing chorus of discontent, counterinsurgency is still the next big thing to many analysts, and there is a tendency to want to be the one to crack the code, find that particularly nifty acronym that explains it all, or show why everyone else has gotten it wrong. Within the ensuing deluge of counterinsurgency-related articles and books, there will be wheat as well as chaff.

So there is definitely a need for criticism, but the aim of such a debate should be to improve on rather than kill the scholarship. There seems to be a desire to resign the whole 'counterinsurgency' concept to the intellectual wastebasket, which risks sacrificing what the concept has provided: a useful starting point to understand and discuss armed conflict and political violence, issues that today need to be discussed, whether in terms of 'counterinsurgency' or not.

A Matter of Expectations

Perhaps by scaling back on what is meant and promised by the concept of 'counterinsurgency', it may be possible to enter into a more constructive debate about the nature of political violence, the requirements for effective intervention, and the wisdom of such intervention in specific cases. What does it mean, and what does it not mean, to see value in counterinsurgency as a concept? To me, counterinsurgency retains value because it:

1. reaffirms the need to understand the social, cultural and political dimensions of the operating environment;
   
2. reaffirms the significant requirements of effective intervention in foreign polities;
   
3. emphasises the political essence of armed conflict;
   
4. recognises the local population as a significant player, rather than as an obstacle to circumvent;
   
5. recommends a more-than-military approach to the problem of political violence.
   

What counterinsurgency does  not  do is:

1. suggest the facility of foreign intervention so long as you've read Galula;
   
2. provide a formula or scientific model to the problem of political violence;
   
3. provide an answer to 'the War on Terror', or al-Qaeda writ large;
   
4. provide an answer to what the US should do in Afghanistan;
   
5. suggest that the use of force is irrelevant in modern conflicts.
   

It is on this basis that I would regret the disappearance, once more, of counterinsurgency. The one good reason to get rid of the term is precisely because of its divisive and distorting connotations; the aim then would be to talk more plainly about the requirements of war-to-peace transitions. But this presumes That the lessons of counterinsurgency That Have Been Sufficiently internalised the concept has lost the ITS as an important utility Antithesis. And I fear That we are not quite there yet.

Tiffany Shower Invites

Il fallimento del riformismo comunista

Three books, three different stories told by the protagonists of Italian communism. Alfredo Reichlin, Renzo Foa, Enrico Morando. Together they form a comprehensive view of the political life of the majority party of the Italian left from the war of liberation to the present with its own strengths, weaknesses, mistakes and accountability in national history. They all agree on a conclusion implied. The crisis of the partito erede di quell'esperienza, del Partito Democratico, è da attribuirsi al modo maldestro di fare i conti con la propria esperienza da parte del PCI che, per arrivare alla svolta della Bolognina, aspettò la caduta del Muro di Berlino. Momento ben diverso dalla catartica e coraggiosa Bad Gotesberg, dal nome della cittadina vicino a Bonn, quando la Socialdemocrazia tedesca nel 1959 non si definì più né marxista né comunista. "Io sono uno che con il comunismo si e' bruciato le dita. Dovete credermi quando vi dico che di libertà si può parlare solo nella libertà". Con queste strazianti parole, Herbert Wehner, allora capo dei deputati dell'SPD al parlamento, aveva convinto anche la minoranza più riluttante. Ma al PCI missed this act of courage and has since slipped on political events through countless jerks, twists twisted out of tune and discussions on formulas and labels that affect only the insiders. As evidence, the jumble of elected representatives of the Democratic Party in the European Parliament, where you can see the ladies sitting in almost all parliamentary groups, to offer such a unique reality show.

But could a different way? It was conceivable that the old PCI was able to change skin in the mirror and telling the truth? Morando and Reichlin still think that another way was possible, the original Italian Communist precedence over continuity, that the specific was stronger than the national orthodoxy. Here is the whole tragic mistake even the best from the reformist party of Togliatti. And the limit is in the DNA in the marrow of the lion to return to Calvin, which is intertwined with the vicissitudes of national history, the way in which that country is out of the cold war, that is a road that has just saved the heirs of Stalin in Italian dressing.

Morando, historic leader of the group of the best, senator since 1994, in "reformers and Communists. From PCI to the Democratic Party. The 'best' in Italian politics" (Donzelli, 2010, € 17) is polished in taking the path of same Amendola, the father of all the reformers of the PCI, the limits of the Italian road to socialism. Ironically! After years of dreaming about the moment the possibility of transformation of the Communist Party, once so thanks to the implosion of the Soviet Union, once the story with its strangeness on a silver platter offers a unique opportunity to jump on coach of the winners, the only group that was believed to also equipped with instruments to guide and cultural theorists that stage, you surprise with a minority mentality or "current".

The causes of that appointment was not written in the genetic code of communism Marxism Leninism, also in amendoliana that, while equipping itself with a vision of reality and history of Italy only capacity for political power in comparison with other European sister parties, there remained within the bed of all that tradition and all that it meant. First, Morando and does well to emphasize, the best they could not escape from the logic unit of the party intended as a prius, lay outside the church which was inconceivable truth and individual life. The second block is to be found in the excessive tactics, but also the result of the previous limit, which has always favored the internal logic, the "own position" than other groups and the outside world. The last limit of cultural origin, has meant that the reformers saw the PCI is always how different (and better) than the other reformist historical traditions, than to the liberal socialist, excluding any form of contamination.

In a word, quell'89 missing was the policy. Tangentopoli no more, with the destruction of the PSI, with the elimination dell'ingombrante another, took the urgent need for the whole of the former PCI executive team to really come to terms with its past. The truth was that communism was not reformed in any way, turn it into something else was impossible.

Dell'irriformabilità of communism, the inexistence of any dream "third way" if they made well aware of the late Renzo Foa ("I saw die il comunismo, Marsilio, 15 €, pagg 207) in un percorso simile a tanti altri ex comunisti, da Silone a Koestler. Prima da corrispondente e poi da direttore dell'Unità, dal 1972 al 1992, uno dei figli delle grandi e storiche famiglie della sinistra italiana ha avuto modo di toccare con mano la realtà del comunismo realizzato e la resistenza ad ogni cambiamento, non dovuta ad una qualche volontà nascosta e nefasta, ma a causa di un magma composto da ideologia, concezioni teoriche, istituzioni e pratiche che rendevano la materia più dura della lava e ne rendevano impossibile ogni trasformazione. Foa, già convinto della falsità delle promesse del comunismo, si rende conto dell'inconsistenza dell'ultima speranza con Gorbaciov Perestroika and his dream of discerning between economic freedoms and civil liberties. And that awareness will lead to terms and permanently with the Marxism-Leninism, and the PCI to recognize the nature of that mystifying world built on the systematic distortion of the truth, the continuous shift of opinion concerning the reality, with words never calls aware of the correspondence with the world.

But it would wrong to limit the reality of the PCI only relationship with freedom. The life of a model communist, partisan, director of Unity, director of the federation as Alfredo Reichlin ("The marrow of the lion. Reflections on the Italian crisis, Laterza, € 15) is exemplary. That party - the party par excellence - was also a great school of politics, able to reflect on the Italian society trying to identify trends, movement and power relations between the classes with the central engine of the proletariat, the working class, the masses, as it was then. The daily exercise of reading the concrete phenomena, despite strong ideological bias, was the result of a method of "playing politics" now lost, shared by thousands of executives, managers and even simple militants. "Be careful analysis - Togliatti told us - because 'all wrong if the wrong analysis.' And in fact, from what could move the political initiative se non 'dall'analisi concreta della situazione concreta?' ". A questa lavorio continuo di presenza, di forza di adattamento alle pieghe della realtà si deve la capacità, altrimenti incomprensibile, che lo fece diventare il più forte partito comunista dell'occidente con una forza di attrazione di ceti medi, intellettuali e alto borghesi senza pari nel resto di Europa, senza d'altronde dimenticare il punto di partenze, la necessità di emancipazione del lavoro. "Ho conosciuto i paesi della povertà estrema"; Reichlin fu testimone dello sviluppo economico, vide quella profonda trasformazione antropologica così ben tratteggiata da Pasolini ed è fiero di aver provato un sentimento - quell' "immensa felicità della politica che si fa popolo, che riscrive la storia e ricostruisce la nazione. La Repubblica" - che ormai la sinistra si è dimenticata, ridotta com'è ad una marmellata, frullato di giustizialismo e sete pura di potere.

Date queste premesse, si capisce allora lo sgomento che prova davanti alla situazione attuale della sinistra. La fine del partito, ha comportato la perdita del luogo della politica - "oggi dove si fa una analisi?" si domanda scorato - e quindi la fine della capacità di individuare problemi e soluzioni degne di questo nome – "la sinistra sembra analfabeta". Reichlin è durissimo con il PD e le scorciatoie moralistiche che hanno proposto letture di comodo e insensate sulla recente storia italiana. Berlusconi non is a monster, the PDL is not a party, plastic, Italy is a country divided into friends and enemies, good and bad of each other. The old Communist leader from afar can not believe these jokes which are in the chat said that the dominant republic as forty consociativismo and suffocation of civil society by the 'party politics': the killer of anti-rumor that has opened the way for Berlusconi. " E 'lucid in identifying the foundations of the Italian crisis not only in the context of a political system, but the same shape was born after the Second World War, the creation of material to work saw the so-called constitutional arc and he called for fifty years the way of being with the Italian people. The crisis of the first Republic to Reichlin is short due to sudden rages (other than judges and corruption ", is coming to speak), but a profound upheavals that have completely changed the reality and the identity of the country.

And therein lies the true limit of the analysis of old and passionate fighter. If, in fact, the PCI had expressed a political class that level raised with patience and care, trained to interpret the reality, within certain theoretical frameworks, doctrinaire and ideological well-defined, but also able to communicate with the most advanced bourgeois culture, because he was unable to understand nothing of the times in which it was producing in Italy and around the world? Why national leaders, D'Alema and Veltroni, do not go there, first of all political action took place at a tactical level and within the space of power, while the former mayor of Rome, produces banal halfway between a watered-down radicalism and the myth of Kennedy's ill-digested?

Perhaps then it is appropriate to conclude that the tradition of the left, even in its best part, I refer to liberal social democracy, has finished his course of history in the late seventies of the last century when the welfare state has been completely achieved. Now the policy is called upon to resolve many other challenges that call globalization, migrations, financing of the economy, dematerialization of work, the crisis of nation-state, technological challenges to the natural foundations of the human species. All issues completely unrelated to the theoretical tradition of any kind of socialism (and the old right-wing liberal and secular).

Club Penguin How Many Missions Are There

Appeals Consideration of June 30, 2009 June 8, 2010

Risultati della prova scritta:

VOTO COGNOME NOME MATRICOLA

(il voto è già comprensivo dei due punti della eventuale presentazione (tesina) in aula)

20 Alice Nadia 149200
27 Amico Antonella 149123
22 Artale Pamela 141561
19 Bergamaschi Luca 149240
26 Bersighelli Silvia 150189
30 L Bodritti Alberto 149209
18 Boffa Matteo 148454
26 Bonzano Silvia 150148
27 Carenzo Davide 141458
23 Castaldo Martina 149549
19 Causio Letizia
149276 18 118149 Centraco Gianfranco
18 Cerroni Mirko
123598 25 148513
Ciccone Stefano Fabrizio Cicerale n n Curetti Amber
142258 149186 150197

25 26 Damiano Marco Alberto De Mattei
150271 18 150196 Degiovanni Ilene
21 Dell'Anna 19 Dominic Matteo
Mirko 149134 140474 133274
n Ferraro Roberto Floris Alessandro
18
152488 18 150074
n Foini Barbara Fusco Alessandro Garofalo Salvatore 22 13966 148118

Danilo Gatto 21 26 Giobergia Jessica
148375 149038 147975
Peter Judge
18 Grade 24 Claudia Luca Guglielmone 149278 23 149137

n / n Guide David
138034 153435
27 Italian Giuseppe Lanzafame Alberto
148669 22 140503
Loconsolo Federica Mancini Benedetta 19 22 148 581
Morello Claudio
148575 22 146231 Naretto Martina
n Alberto Panero
148270 18 149944 Pellicone Giulia

18 132631 19 Petrarulo Claudio Fabrizio Pintus
148583 Simone 149649 30 Polimeni
18 Pontrelli Alessandro 149528
Delmarco Stephen Rella 18 148944 139905
Luca Risso
19 25 23 Rhodium Peter Rosi Raimonda
146768 147352 140916
Andrea Rubino
n n Ruffa Caterina Santoro Roberto 18
115237 130554 147460
Alessandro Savio
18 21 148 613 Henry Schio
22 Slanzi Cristina
149771 140061 n / Spampinato Diego
19 Strillacci Richard Matthew Trabucco 133902 19 149913


nc = not classified

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